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OF THE

This case involves unpaid wages owed by the City of Lapwai to its former employee,
Mercedes Turner. The District Court granted the City's motion for summary judgment, ruling
the notice provided to the City by Ms. Turner regarding her claim was technically deficient. The
District

two primary reasons. First, the alleged technical deficiencies

erred

District Court were not, in fact, deficiencies; Ms. Turner's notice complied with Idaho law. Second,
even assuming arguendo the validity ofthe alleged technical deficiencies cited by the District Court,
the City had actual notice, and was not in fact misled, regarding Ms. Turner's claims, thereby
rendering Ms. Turner's notice substantively effective. For these reasons, the District Court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of the City should be reversed.
B.

Procedural History
Ms. Turner filed her complaint against the City of Lapwai on December 21, 2012. (R Vol.

I, pp. 4-9.) The City moved for summary judgment on all of Ms. Turner's claims on July 13,2013.
(R Vol. I, pp. 15-16.) The District Court granted the City's motion for summary judgment on
September 20,

3. (R Vol. I, pp. 117-127.) Judgment in favor

I,
33.)

-5

City was

pni-pr?'ri

on
3.

Ms.

was

by

to serve as its

treasurer

I, p. 62, .,-r2.) Ms. Turner was also compensated for duties performed for the City's water, sewer, and
street departments.

VoL I,

.) Ms. Turner agreed with the City Council and David Fazzio,

then the City's mayor, that Ms. Turner would be paid an annual salary on the basis of a thirty-five
hour work week,

I, p.

at

addition to

Fazzio and the City Council agreed that Ms. Turner would accrue compensatory time ("comp time")
at a one-to-one ration for every hour that she worked in excess of her required thirty-five hours
during a given work week. (R Vol. I, p. 63, at .,-rS.) Ms. Turner's comp time would be paid at the
rate equal to her hourly salary up to 40 hours, and at a rate of 1.S times her hourly salary for over 40
hours. (R VoL I, p. 63, at .,-rS.) Ms. Turner's comp time was to be paid upon her termination or
departure from employment with the City. (R Vo1. I, p. 63, at .,-rS.) At the time this agreement was
made, the City was suffering a budgetary crisis, and Mr. Fazzio and Ms. Turner agreed that comp
time, in lieu of overtime pay, would benefit the City fiscally because the City would not have to
compensate Ms. Turner for all her overtime during each pay period. (R Vol. I, p. 63, at .,-r6.)
Ms. Turner was a

often working long hours, nights, and weekends due to
""-'UHL. ...,U

APPELLANT'S

state

to
at

to drive to

to

City's
to

I,
own expense,

purchases, at

necessary for the basic functioning of the City. (R Vol. I, p. 63, at ~9.)
Ms. Turner's employment with the City ended in January 2011. (R Vol. I,

6 3, at ~l

At the conclusion ofher employment with the City, Ms. Turner was owed compensation for 84 hours
of wages, 611
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of comp time.

I,

at

ON

err

v.

CUBUlU'-)

judgment?

FEES ON

Ms. Turner has claimed fees in this case pursuant to I.C.

45-615(2), 12-1

and 1 121,

and LR.C.P. 54(d).
ARGUMENT

A.

Standard ofAppellate Review
"When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review for this Court is

the same standard as that used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Summary judgment is
appropriate if 'the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter oflaw.'" Intermountain Real Properties, LLCv. Draw, LLC, 155 Idaho 313,
311 P.3d 734, 737 (2013) (quoting LR.C.P. 56( c». To the extent there exist disputed facts, they
"should be construed in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party." !d.
B.

Analysis
as a matter

(l
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I,

1,

I,

to

I,pp . 77-79),

"sufficient

to

purposes

creating

notice to

'-'''-''L' ...H-U.HU''H

the City" regarding her claim (R Vol. I, p. 124), was nonetheless technically deficient for five
reasons: (1) the notice failed to state the amount of her claim (R Vol. I, pp. 124, 125);

the notice

failed to explicitly state that Ms. Turner would file suit against the City ifher claim was not satisfied

I, pp. 1

was not

125);

the

I, p. 122);

the notice failed to provide Ms. Turner's address (R Vol. I, p. 122); and (5) the notice failed to
provide information regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding Ms. Turner's claim (R VoL
I, p. 122).

The District Court erred for two reasons. First, the alleged technical deficiencies cited by
the District Court were not, in fact, deficiencies; Ms. Turner's notice complied with Idaho law.
Second, even assuming arguendo the validity of the alleged technical deficiencies cited by the
District Court, the City and actual notice, and was not in fact misled, regarding Ms. Turner's claims,
thereby rendering Ms. Turner's notice substantively effective. For these reasons, the District Court's
1:,rrant of summary judgment in favor of the City should be reversed.

1.
a

as

§
presented to

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 9

or

1

arose or

must

§ 6-907 sets

Idaho

§

gIven

the contents requirements for a notice

tort

All claims presented to and filed with a governmental entity shall
accurately describe the conduct and circumstances which brought
about the injury or damage, describe the injury or damage, state the
time and place the injury or damage occurred, state the names of all
persons involved, ifknown, and shall contain the amount of damages
claimed, together with a statement
the
claimant at the time 0 fpresenting
filing
claim and
a period
of six (6) months immediately prior to the time the claim arose....
A claim filed under the provisions of this section shall not be held
invalid or insufficient by reason of an inaccuracy in stating the time,
place, nature or cause of the claim, or otherwise, unless it is shown
that the governmental entity was in fact misled to its injury thereby.
The purpose ofthe Tort Claims Act's notice requirement is to "(1) save needless expense and
litigation by providing an opportunity for amicable resolution ofthe differences between parties, (2)
allow authorities to conduct a full investigation into the cause of the injury in order to determine the
extent ofthe state's liability, if any, and (3) allow the state to prepare defenses." Pounds v. Denison,
120 Idaho 425, 426-27 (1991) (quoting Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398, 401 (1981».

2.

Ms. Turner's Notice Clearly Stated the Amount of Her Claim.

The District Court ruled that Ms. Turner's notice was technically deficient because it failed
to present
because I"

amount of her claim to

City:

are

u."'."."'VUL

for purposes

lI"lIl!" ""

pay
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was

"

I,

no

notice

amounts she was
relies

J"''-'''-HJl>',

not set

"

I,

125.)

specific amounts the Plaintiff was seeking[.]"

Idaho Code § 6-907 requires that notice "shall contain the amount of damages claimed." The
District Court erred because the amount of Ms. Turner's claim against the City was clearly stated
in several places in her January 20, 2011 check request; the voided check prepared by Ms. Turner
IS

in the amount

1,111

exact amount

she was owed by the City. (R Vol. I, p. 66.) The voided check, under "Statement of Eaming and
Deductions", broke down Ms. Turner's total claim of $31,111.26 with greater specificity:
84 regular hours claimed, at the hourly rate of$32.0640, totaling $2,963.33;
611 vacation hours claimed, at the hourly rate of$32.0640, totaling $19,591.10;
898.25 comp time hours claimed, at the hourly rate of $32.0640, totaling $28,801.49;
Taxable deductions totaling $19,974.71.
(R Vol. I, p. 66.)
The City confirmed that it was aware of the amount claimed by Ms. Turner. In his March
21, 2011 letter to Ms. Turner, Mayor Hernandez stated:
the City of Lapwai is currently
This letter is to inform you
reviewing your final request for reimbursement
time and other reimbursable items.

A..PPELLANT'S BRIEF - 1

amount
claim.

received

check, reviewed

Ms. Turner the amounts not in dispute, and then submitted the remaining disputed amount to an
outside accounting service for review. (R Vol. I,

.) The letter goes on to refer to the "entity

[sic] of the requested compensation." (R Vol. I, p. 8a) It is evident that the City's reference to Ms.
"requested compensation" necessarily means that

Turner informed

of the

amount she claimed she was owed thereby.

3.

Idaho Law does not Require any "Magic Words" Regarding Future Legal
Action in a Tort Claim Notice.

The District Court ruled that Ms. Turner's notice was technically deficient because it failed
to explicitly state that Ms. Turner would file suit against the City ifher claim was not satisfied: "Nor
do the letters inform the City that Turner was planning to file suit against the City if she did not
receive compensation for those requested items." (R Vol. I, p. 124.) "Nor did Turner ever indicate
to the City that she would pursue a claim in court in the event the City did not comply with her
requests." (R Vol. I, p. 125.) "Nor do (documents the Plaintiff relies upon] adequately put the City
on notice that Turner would file suit if the payments were not made." (R Vol. I,
District Court erred because Idaho law does not

any "magic

a tort claim

1S

must

BRIEF - 12

an

or

125.)
regarding

1'\nF'ClrQ

case

to

"'--' VLun.''"'

this

"magic
herein were

v. State: "Although

Cln,..,Clrp,,,

investigated and reports thereof were filed, nevertheless there is no indication that the State could
have even suspected it might be subject to a claim." 96 Idaho 711, 716

975).

Read in context, this statement in Newlan in no way adds a "magic words" regarding future
to Idaho tort claim notice law. In

the

were

of a driver killed in a motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by inappropriate paving materials
specified by the Idaho Department of Highways. Id. at 712. The incident occurred on June 1, 1971.
Id. The State investigated the accident and filed a report thereon. !d. at 716. The plaintiffs,
however, took no action until they filed a notice of tort claim nearly two years later, on May 24,
1973. Id. at 712. The plaintiffs sued the State one week later, on June 1, 1973. Id. The trial court
dismissed the suit because the notice of tort claim was untimely,1 and the plaintiffs appealed. Id. 2
After first ruling that the 120-day limitations period for the filing of notice of a tort claim was
not unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, Id. at 714, the Supreme Court considered the
appellant's argument that their suits should not be dismissed, notwithstanding the untimely tort claim

1

it was
at7 6.

argument,

cited

v.

(1969), for the proposition that a plaintiff who gives no tort claim notice may nonetheless pursue a
suit if the State or municipal entity had actual notice of the plaintiffs injury. Newlan,

Idaho at

716.
Supreme

argument, ruling that the weight of authority requires

a plaintiff to demonstrate "some action of some type taken or attempted by the plaintiffs within the
statutory notice period showing at least some compliance with the notice requirement. ... None of
those cases appear to cover a situation where a plaintiff took no action whatsoever within the
statutory period." Id.
Applying this rationale, the Supreme Court found that indeed, the Newlans took no action
whatsoever during the statutory notice period. Id. The Supreme Court then rejected the argument
that the State's own investigation of, and actual notice regarding, the motor vehicle accident could
obviate the requirement that a plaintiff or claimant must take their own, proactive steps to put the
State on notice of a potential claim against it: "Although the accidents involved herein were
apparently investigated and 1"'pr'£'>r1'C thereof were filed, nevertheless there is no
even

Hn.)"v~LHV'H

that

to a
statement

as

to
at

6.

proactively and independently submitted three different documents to the City, undisputedly during
the statutory notice
check request (R

U..,'"'VIJ.

that clearly detailed her claim. (See

I, pp. 66-74);
to

Turner's (1) January 20,2011

February 1, 2011 letter to Mayor Hernandez (R Vol. I, p. 76);
ULH,LH'UL

Smith

I, pp.

Unlike the Newlan plaintiffs, Ms. Turner's own actions and documents put the City on notice
of her claim against it; Ms. Turner does not rely on the City's own investigation or some other form
of actual notice in order to satisfy the notice requirements ofI.C. §§ 50-219 and 6-907. The District
Court cites no further authority, and Ms. Turner has located none, supporting the proposition that
a notice oftort claim that does not use "magic words" regarding future legal action is deficient.
Furthermore, even if"magic words" were required, Ms. Turner threatened future action and
proceedings if her claim was not satisfied. In her letter to City Councillor Antonio Smith, Ms.
Turner stated:
Lastly I am making a request for payment of my vacation and comptime pay. I was forced to file a claim with the US [sic] Department
Mayor will be hearing from them soon
I am sure
I hated to file a claim but it has been over a
City.
statement can

no

was

The District Court ruled

Ms. Turner's notice was deficient because it was not filed with

the City clerk: "However, these letters were not filed with the city clerk .... " (R Vol. I, p. 122.)
Idaho Code § 6-906 requires that notice "be presented to and filed with the clerk or secretary
claim arose or reasonably should

political

been discovered. The District Court erred because Ms. Turner's notice was provided to, and
received by, City officials of greater rank and authority than the City clerk. Ms. Turner provided
notice ofher claim to Mayor Hernandez (R Vol. I, p. 76) and City Councillor Antonio Smith (R Vol.
I, p. 77-79). Mayor Hernandez continned receipt of Ms. Turner's notice by writing Ms. Turner on
March 21, 2011 and infonning her that the:
City of Lapwai is currently reviewing your final request for
reimbursement of comprehensive time and other reimbursable items.
The City has retained an outside accounting service to assist in our
review of your request. To date, we have provided you with the
amount that is not in dispute, but until the completion of this review
we will be unable to provide you with the entity [sic] ofthe requested
compensation.
(R Vol. I, p. 80.) Mayor Hernandez's statements undisputedly demonstrate that Ms. Turner's notice
was received,

to

- 6

her claim.

to
same notice

to

UUJ""-'Uon to

would have been sufficient. It is, however, the ultimate triumph of form over substance to hold
notice defective simply because it is transmitted directly to the relevant decision maker, with receipt
confirmed thereby, rather than through an intermediary and from then on to the decision maker. In
case the

IS

up in the hands ofthe decision

maker, as was undisputedly the case here as demonstrated by Mayor Hernandez's March 21,2011
letter to Ms. Turner.
Indeed, this form over substance approach was rejected in Huffv. Uhf, 103 Idaho 274 (1982).
In Huff, the plaintiff claimed damages against the Minidoka Irrigation District. Id. at 275. The
plaintiff personally provided notice of the claim, in the form of repair estimates, to the receptionist
at the Minidoka Irrigation District. Id. The receptionist then immediately and undisputedly gave
the notice to the irrigation district's secretary treasurer. Id. The irrigation district argued that the
notice was defective because it was given to a receptionist, not to the "clerk or secretary of the
political subdivision" as required by I.e. § 6-906.

at 276. This argument was rejected:

It is difficult
us to see
more could be called for. Certainly,
secretary's office, it is
as long as the notice is delivered to
to

at 276-77.

BRIEF - 17

Similarly,

27

v.

argument that a

to

from a

City of

Sandpoint, constituted insufficient notice. The letter was not specifically addressed to the city clerk,
but only to

"City

Sandpoint" generally.

addressed to the City describes the conduct
to

at 32. "This letter from the Cox's attorney and
circumstances which brought about a claimed injury

"

The plaintiff in Huff undisputedly provided notice to a receptionist, and not to the "clerk or
secretary of the political subdivision" as required by I.e. § 6-906. The Supreme Court nonetheless
ruled that the notice was sufficient. Huff thus stands for the proposition that § 6-906 need not be
exactly followed as long as the claim undisputedly comes to the attention of those decision makers
ultimately responsible for the claim's disposition. Such is the case of Ms. Turner's notice. Even
though Ms. Turner did not provide direct notice to the acting City clerk, Mayor Hernandez's March
20, 2011 letter undisputedly demonstrates that Ms. Turner's notice was received by those with the
authority to decide her claim because, as Mayor Hernandez's letter states, the City paid Ms. Turner
a portion of her claimed wages, but was investigating the remainder of the claimed wages.
The District Court cited the federal
2d 1256

court case

v. City afCaldwell, 769
did
were

not
to

APPELLANT'S
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Court's reliance on

was

this case are

and remain more

distinguishable from those

to

notice was provided to the fire chief. Though a fire chief is a city official, it is safe to assume that
the fire chief does not have ultimate decision making authority regarding whether to pay a claim
against the city, by use of city funds. By contrast, Ms. Turner's notice was provided to the Mayor,
Turner's claim

who actually had authority to decide, and indeed

against the City, or a portion thereof, by use of City funds. Furthermore, the Brown case is devoid
of evidence demonstrating that the mayor or clerk of the City of Caldwell had actual notice of the
plaintiffs claims against the City of Caldwell. By contrast, Mayor Hernandez's March 20,2011
letter to Ms. Turner undisputedly demonstrates that the City had actual notice of Ms. Turner's claim,
decided to pay a portion thereof, and was reviewing the remainder of the claim. Just as in Huff, even
if Ms. Turner's notice did not adhere to the exact requirements of § 6-906, the record undisputedly
demonstrates that the notice in question was successfully delivered to those with the authority to
assess the claim.
5.

Ms. Turner's Notice Contained her Address.

The District Court ruled that Ms. Turner's notice was
address:

"

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 19

U'-'~~"'H.d~

because the notice failed to
regarding

I,

1

§ 6-907

a

filing the claim

state
for a

at
to the

time the claim arose .... " The District Court erred because Ms. Turner's notice included her
address. The January 20, 2011 check request submitted by Ms. Turner includes her address: 1722
Powers Avenue in Lewiston. (R Vol. I, p. 66.) The City undisputedly knew Ms. Turner's address
City gave

Turner on

amounts

not in dispute, also lists Ms. Turner's address as 1722 Powers Avenue in Lewiston. (R Vol. I, p. 75.)

6.

Ms. Turner's Notice Provided Sufficient Information Regarding the Facts
and Circumstances Surrounding the Case.

The District Court ruled that Ms. Turner's notice was deficient because it failed to provide
information regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding Ms. Turner's claim: "[N)or did they
contain statutorily-specified information regarding ... the facts and circumstances surrounding the
case." (R Vol. I, p. 122.)
Idaho Code § 6-907 requires that a notice "describe the conduct and circumstances which
brought about the injury or damage, describe the injury or damage, state the time and place the injury
or damage occurred, state the names of all persons involved, ifknown."
Ms. Turner's notice provided sufficient information 1""'<Y9..,'11
case.

BRIEF - 20

District Court erred
circumstances

)
amounts

by regular, vacation,

her claim

tax

deductions. (R Vol. I, p. 66.) Accompanying the check request, Ms. Turner provided the City a
leave time report (R Vol. I, p. 68), a leave time accrual register
accrual register (R Vol. I,

70), and a payroll detail register (R Vol. I,

1,

Turner's

Vol. I,

11 letter to

a vacation

71-73).

Hernandez

has "not received [her] final check form [sic] the City of Lapwai." (R Vol. I, p. 76.)
Ms. Turner's February 28, 20111etier to City Councillor Smith (1) reiterates Ms. Turner's
claim for vacation and comp time pay (R Vol. I, p. 78); (2) states that Ms. Turner has filed a claim
with the U.S. Department of Labor (R VoL I, p. 78); (3) states Ms. Turner's belief that the City has
had sufficient time to either pay her claim or explain why no payment will be forthcoming (R Vol.
I, p. 78); (4) advises that all her time sheets have been signed (R Vol. I, pp. 78-79); (5) points out
that every time Ms. Turner was paid bi-weekly, her accrued vacation and comp time hours were
reflected on her pay stubs (R Vol. I, p. 79); (6) directs attention to the "prelist" reports regarding her
time worked and previously used by the City auditor (R Vol. I, p. 79); and (7) invites the City to
conduct an audit of

payroll records.
notices

more

manner

-2

As discussed supra, the District Court erred in several specific ways. The District

also

erred in a far-reaching manner as well by not viewing Ms. Turner's notice in its entirety and
considering whether the substance thereof was sufficient to satisfY § 6-907. Under Idaho law, notice
deficient nonetheless satisfies § 6-907 unless

IS

that it was in fact misled regarding the claim. In essence, the District Court erred by engaging in a
form over substance analysis when § 6-907 and Idaho precedent directs courts to do exactly the
opposite and engage in a substance over form analysis.
Significantly, § 6-907 includes a burden-shifting caveat indicating the legislative priority of
substances over form: "A claim filed under the provisions of this section shall not be held invalid
or insufficient by reason of an inaccuracy in stating the time, place, nature or cause of the claim, or
otherwise, unless it is shown that the governmental entity was in fact misled to its injury thereby."
(emphasis added) See also Cox, 140 Idaho at 131 ("There is no express format for a claim under the
ITCA."). The practical application of this caveat means that technically deficient notice may
nonetheless satisfY § 6-907 unless the governmental entity affirmatively demonstrates that it was
regarding

alleged injury.
City was

2 ,

- 22

ULl'-",,!-'U

not

reviewing your final request
and other
retained an outside accounting service to assist our
date, we have provided you with the
review of your request.
amount that is not in dispute, but until the completion of this review
we will be unable to provide you with the entity [sic] ofthe requested
compensation.
(R Vol. I, p. 80.) Mayor Hernandez's letter unequivocally demonstrates that Ms. Turner's notice
was

it was

the

aware

Turner's

s

payment of a portion of Ms. Turner's claim and retention of an outside accounting firm to "assist in
our review of your request" leaves no argument that the City was misled regarding, or ignorant of,
Ms. Turner's claim.
In keeping with the burden-shifting nature of § 6-907, Idaho courts have consistently applied
a "substance over form" analysis to tort notices. In Smith v. City ofPreston, 99 Idaho 618 (1978),
the plaintiff's insurer sent the City of Preston a letter outlining its subrogation claim against it based
on an automobile accident suffered by the plaintiffthat was allegedly caused by the City of Preston' s
failure to remove foliage obscuring a stop sign. Id. at 621. The City of Preston's insurance carrier
responded to the letter, denying the SUbrogation. Id. The plaintiff sued the City of Preston, which
argued

the letter

the plaintiff's insurer failed to technically satisfy
engaged

§

APPELLAl'JT'S
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"substance over

enumerated s
we
contents
of the letter were adequate light of the final proviso of that section
which states that "(a) claim . . . shall not be held invalid or
insufficient by reason of an inaccuracy in stating the time, place,
nature or cause of the claim, or otherwise, unless it is shown that the
governmental entity was in fact misled to its injury thereby."
vU'.VU.'"

[d. Additionally, the Smith court noted that "[T]he reply by the city's insurance carrier indicates

the ...

was

HvlvHC

to notify

city that a claim against it was being pursued

to

apprise the city of sufficient facts for it to investigate the matter, determine its merits and prepare
a defense." Id.
Similarly, in the Huff case discussed supra, the plaintiff was involved in an automobile
accident wherein he was struck by a vehicle owned and operated by the Minidoka County Irrigation
District. 103 Idaho at 275. Four days after the accident, the plaintiff went to the irrigation district
office, told the receptionist there he had been in an accident with an irrigation district truck, and left
a copy of the estimate to repair his car. Id. The irrigation district argued that the written repair
estimate was technically deficient because it did not contain all the information required by § 6-907.

Id. at 276. The court rejected this argument, ruling that "although the written estimate itself did not
contain a statement

demand, M.LD. was clearly apprised
court

prosecuted against
matter

the fact that a claim was being
UUJeHL'..AL

to

fact
it

not engage
"substance over

of analysis cOlltamea

tort claim

was reiterated:

recognize that there may be flaws in these notices of claim, but such flaws will render the notices
insufficient only if the City 'was in fact misled to its injury thereby.'" 140 Idaho at 132.
The facts surrounding Ms. Turner's notice are functionally identical to the facts ofbotYmith
and

deficient and failed to

cases,

6-907 to the letter. Indeed, the notices in Smith and Huff were quite informal; a repair estimate in
the former and a subrogation letter in the latter. In both cases, however, the notice was deemed
substantively sufficient to satisfy § 6-907 because the governmental entities were clearly and
undisputedly aware of the claims against them. In this case, the March 21, 20 II letter from Mayor
Hernandez to Mrs. Turner undisputedly demonstrated that the City was aware of the facts and
circumstances surrounding Ms. Turner's claim and was not misled in relation thereto. Thus, even
assuming arguendo the validity of the technical deficiencies noted by the District Court, the District
Court erred by not continuing its § 6-907 analysis and deciding whether the City was in fact misled.
Both Smith and Huffhold that ifthe City was not misled, then any alleged technical deficiencies in
Ms. Turner's notice constitutes harmless error and are of no moment.

two
were
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Second, even assuming
alleged technical

the

Court,

City

validity
actual

was not

fact misled, regarding Ms. Turner's claims, thereby rendering Ms. Turner's notice substantively
effective. For these reasons, the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor

the City

should be reversed.
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BRASSEY, CRAWFORD & HOWELL, PLLC

the Finn
eys for Appellant

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 26

I
on
March,
4, I served a true
correct
copy of the foregoing
APPELLANT MERCEDES TURNER, upon each of the
following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the method and to the addresses
indicated below:
Bentley G. Stromberg
Clements, Brown & McNichols,
11
P.O. Box 1510
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
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u.s. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Facsimile (208) 746-0753

